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On the Fingerprinting Capacity Under the Marking
Assumption
N. Prasanth Anthapadmanabhan, Alexander Barg, Fellow, IEEE, and Ilya Dumer, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract— We address the maximum attainable rate of finger-
printing codes under the marking assumption, studying lower
and upper bounds on the value of the rate for various sizes of
the attacker coalition. Lower bounds are obtained by considering
typical coalitions, which represents a new idea in the area of
fingerprinting and enables us to improve the previously known
lower bounds for coalitions of size two and three. For upper
bounds, the fingerprinting problem is modelled as a communica-
tions problem. It is shown that the maximum code rate is bounded
above by the capacity of a certain class of channels, which are
similar to the multiple-access channel. Converse coding theorems
proved in the paper provide new upper bounds on fingerprinting
capacity.
It is proved that capacity for fingerprinting against coalitions
of size two and three over the binary alphabet satisfies 0.25 ≤
C2,2 ≤ 0.322 and 0.083 ≤ C3,2 ≤ 0.199 respectively. For
coalitions of an arbitrary fixed size t, we derive an upper
bound (t ln 2)−1 on fingerprinting capacity in the binary case.
Finally, for general alphabets, we establish upper bounds on
the fingerprinting capacity involving only single-letter mutual
information quantities.
Index Terms— Digital fingerprinting, channel capacity,
multiple-access channel, strong converse theorem.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE distribution of licensed digital content (e.g., software,movies, music etc.) has become increasingly popular in
recent times. With this comes the need to protect the copyright
of the distributor against unauthorized redistribution of the
content (piracy).
To introduce the problem, we begin with an informal
description. Suppose the distributor has some content which
he would like to distribute among a set of licensed users.
One can think of a simple scheme where each licensed
copy is identified by a unique mark (fingerprint) which is
embedded in the content and is imperceptible to the users of
the system. Note that the distributed copies are identical except
for the fingerprints. If a naive user distributes a copy of his
fingerprinted content, then the pirated copy can easily be traced
back to the guilty user and hence he will be exposed. Tracing
the guilty user becomes more difficult when a collection of
users (pirates) form a coalition to detect the fingerprints and
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modify/erase them before illegally distributing the data. Digital
fingerprinting is a technique that assigns to each user a mark in
a way that enables the distributor to identify at least one of the
members of the coalition as long as its size does not exceed
a certain threshold t, which is a parameter of the problem.
There are two main setups considered for the fingerprinting
problem in the literature. The distortion setting is commonly
used in applications relating to multimedia fingerprinting [14],
[15]. In this model, the fingerprint is usually a “covert signal”
which is superimposed on the original “host” data in such
a way that the difference, or distortion, between the original
and the fingerprinted copies is smaller than some threshold.
The coalitions are restricted to creating a forgery which has
distortion less than some threshold from at least one of the
colluders’ fingerprinted copies.
On the other hand, we have the marking assumption setting
introduced in [10] which will be our main interest in this
paper. In this case, the fingerprint is a set of redundant digits
which are distributed in some random positions (unknown
to the users) across the information digits of the original
content. The fingerprint positions remain the same for all
users. It is assumed that these redundant digits do not af-
fect the functionality of the content, while tampering with
an information digit damages the content permanently. The
motivation for this assumption comes from applications to
software fingerprinting, where modifying arbitrary digits can
damage its functionality.
The coalition attempts to discover some of the fingerprint
positions by comparing their marked copies for differences. If
they find a difference in some position, it is guaranteed to be a
redundant fingerprint digit. In the other positions, it could be
either an information digit or a fingerprint digit. The marking
assumption states that the coalitions may modify only those
positions where they find a difference in their fingerprinted
copies. Hence, in analyzing this model, it becomes sufficient to
just look at the fingerprint positions and ignore the information
digits. The collection of fingerprints distributed to all the users
of the system together with the strategy of decoding (pirate
identification) used is called a code below. A code is said to
be t-fingerprinting or collusion-secure against coalitions of t
pirates if the error probability of decoding approaches 0 as the
code length tends to ∞.
Collusion-secure fingerprinting codes were introduced by
Boneh and Shaw [10]. It was shown in [10] that for any single
deterministic code, the probability of decoding error in the
“wide-sense” formulation (see Section II) is bounded away
from zero. Hence, it becomes necessary for the distributor
to use some form of randomization, where the random key
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is known only to the distributor, in order to construct such
fingerprinting codes. This paper also gave the first example
of codes with vanishing error probability. Further general
constructions were proposed by Barg et al. [6] and Tardos
[17].
The case of zero error probability was considered indepen-
dently by Hollmann et al. [12] who termed them as codes
with the identifiable parent property, or IPP codes. They were
further studied in [7], [3], [8], [16] among others.
In this paper, we are interested in computing the funda-
mental limits of the fingerprinting problem, i.e., in estab-
lishing bounds on the capacity (or maximum attainable rate)
of fingerprinting codes. We denote by Ct,q the capacity of
fingerprinting with q-ary codes against coalitions of size t (this
quantity is defined formally later in the paper). The problem
of determining the fingerprinting capacity was raised in [6]. To
date, only some lower bounds are known through constructions
and existence results: C2,2 ≥ 0.2075 [9]; C3,2 ≥ 0.064 [4];
Ct,2 ≥ (100t
2 ln 2)−1, t ≥ 2 [17].
New capacity bounds of our paper are based on an
information-theoretic view of the fingerprinting problem. They
are established as follows. Attainability results (lower bounds)
are shown by random coding techniques which take into
account the typical coalitions, i.e., the coalitions that oc-
cur with high probability. This represents a new idea in
fingerprinting which enables us to improve random choice
arguments of various kinds used earlier in [4], [10], [9], [17].
For upper bounds we model fingerprinting as a multi-user
communications channel. A converse theorem for a transmis-
sion scenario that models some aspects of the fingerprinting
problem is proved to establish an upper bound on the capacity
of fingerprinting.
It should be noted that a similar information-theoretic ap-
proach to finding the capacity of fingerprinting was previously
studied in [15] and [2]. In [15], the authors obtain upper and
lower bounds on the capacity of fingerprinting with distortion
constraints as opposed to the marking assumption setting of
this paper. Paper [1] uses the marking assumption setting, but
it addresses a simpler problem whose results do not directly
apply to fingerprinting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we recall the statement of the fingerprinting problem and give
an information-theoretic formulation. We also prove several
results related to the problem statement that justify various
techniques used to derive bounds on the fingerprinting capacity
later in the paper. In particular, lower bounds on Ct,2, t = 2, 3
are proved in Section III. Sections IV and V are devoted to
upper bounds on Ct,q for arbitrary t, q and their specializations
for t = 2, 3 in the case of the binary alphabet.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Notation
Random variables (r.v.’s) will be denoted by capital letters
and their realizations by low-case letters. The probability
distribution of a r.v. X will be denoted by PX . If X and
Y are independent r.v.’s, then their joint distribution is written
as PX ×PY . For positive integers l,m, X l+ml will denote the
collection of r.v.’s {Xl, Xl+1, . . . , Xl+m}, and the shorthand
[l] will be used to denote the set {1, . . . , l}. Boldface will
denote vectors of length n. For example, x denotes a vector
(x1, . . . , xn) and X denotes a random vector (X1, . . . , Xn).
The Hamming distance between vectors x,y will be written
as dist(x,y). We will denote the binary entropy function by
h(x) := −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) and 1(·) will represent
the indicator function.
B. Fingerprinting codes
Let Q denote an alphabet of (finite) size q. Let M be the
number of users in the system and let n denote the length
of the fingerprints. Assume that there is some ordering of the
users and denote their set by M = {1, . . . ,M}. Let K be a
finite set whose size may depend on n. Elements of the set
K will be called keys. For every k ∈ K, let (fk, φk) be an
n-length code, i.e., a pair of encoding and decoding mappings:
fk :M→Q
n (1)
φk : Q
n →M∪ {0} (2)
where the decoder output 0 will signify a decoding failure. By
definition, the fingerprinting system is formed by a randomized
code, i.e., a random variable (F,Φ) taking values in the family
{(fk, φk), k ∈ K}. Note that the dependence on n has been
suppressed in this notation for simplicity. The rate of this code
is R = n−1 logqM .
The system operates as follows. The distributor chooses
a key k according to a probability distribution pi(k) on K
and assigns the fingerprint fk(i) to user i. On receiving a
forged fingerprint, the distributor uses the tracing strategy φk
(corresponding to the selected key) to determine one of the
guilty users.
We need randomization because: (a) deterministic finger-
printing codes do not exist in certain formulations [10], [6],
and (b) we allow the family of encoders and decoders and
the distribution pi(k) to be known to all users of the system.
The only advantage the distributor has is the knowledge
of the particular key being used. This assumption follows
the accepted standards of cryptographic systems where it is
usually assumed that the encryption/decryption algorithms are
publicly available and that the only parameter kept secret by
the system’s constructor is the key.
The fingerprints are assumed to be distributed inside the
host message so that its location is unknown to the users. The
location of the fingerprints, however, remains the same for
all users. A coalition U of t users is an arbitrary t-subset of
{1, . . . ,M}. Following accepted usage, we will refer to the
members of the coalition as “pirates”. The coalition observes
the collection of their fingerprints fk(U) = {x1, . . . ,xt} and
attempts to create a fingerprint y ∈ Qn that does not enable
the distributor to trace it back to any of the users in U . Note
that although the fingerprint locations are not available to the
pirates, they may attempt to detect some of these locations by
comparing their copies for differences. Thus, coordinate i of
the fingerprints is called undetectable for the coalition U if
x1i = x2i = · · · = xti
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and is called detectable otherwise.
Definition 2.1: The marking assumption states that for any
fingerprint y created by the coalition U , yi = x1i = x2i =
· · · = xti in every coordinate i that is undetectable.
In other words, in creating y, the pirates can modify only
detectable positions.
For a given set of observed fingerprints {x1, . . . ,xt}, the
set of forgeries that can be created by the coalition is called the
envelope. Its definition depends on the exact rule the coalition
should follow to modify the detectable positions:
• If the coalition is restricted to use only a symbol from
their assigned fingerprints in the detectable positions, we
obtain the narrow-sense envelope:
EN (x1, . . . ,xt) = {y ∈ Q
n|yi ∈ {x1i, . . . , xti}, ∀i};
(3)
• If the coalition can use any symbol from the alphabet
in the detectable positions, we obtain the wide-sense
envelope:
EW (x1, . . . ,xt) = {y ∈ Q
n|yi = x1i, ∀i undetectable}.
(4)
We remark that there are further generalizations of the rules
above where coalitions are also allowed to erase the symbols
in detectable positions. This generalization is not considered
below; we refer the interested reader to [6]. In the following,
we will use E(·) to denote the envelope from any of the rules
or their generalizations mentioned above.
Remark 2.2: The definition for a fingerprinting code de-
pends on the envelope considered. Therefore, different prob-
lems can arise for each definition of the envelope. The binary
alphabet is of special interest because of its wide use in
practical digital applications. For this special case, it is easy to
see that the narrow-sense and wide-sense envelopes are exactly
the same.
Suppose that the coalition U uses a randomized strat-
egy V (·|·, . . . , ·) to create the new fingerprint, where
V (y|x1, . . . ,xt) gives the probability that the coalition creates
y given that it observes the fingerprints x1, . . . ,xt. A strategy
V is called admissible if
V (y|x1, . . . ,xt) > 0 only if y ∈ E(x1, . . . ,xt).
Let Vt denote the class of admissible strategies. Such ran-
domized strategies model any general attack the coalition
is capable of and also facilitate mathematical analysis. The
distributor, on observing the suspect fingerprint y, uses the
decoder φk while using the key k. Then the probability of
error for a given coalition U and strategy V averaged over the
family of codes is defined as follows:
e(U, F,Φ, V ) = EK
∑
y:
φK(y)/∈U
V (y|fK(U)) (5)
where EK is the expectation with respect to the distribution
pi(k).
Definition 2.3: A randomized code (F,Φ) is said to be t-
fingerprinting with ε-error if
max
V ∈Vτ
max
U :|U|=τ
e(U, F,Φ, V ) ≤ ε, ∀τ ≤ t. (6)
C. Fingerprinting capacity
We now formulate the fingerprinting problem as a communi-
cations problem in which the set of messages is identified with
the set of users of the fingerprinting system. Each message is
mapped to a codeword which corresponds to the fingerprint of
the user. Any set of t messages (a coalition) may be chosen,
and they are transmitted over an unknown t-input-single-output
channel defined by the strategy of the coalition. The class of
possible channels will be defined by the marking assumption.
The output of the channel (that represents the strategy) gives
the forged fingerprint. The task of the decoder is to recover
at least one of the transmitted messages to have produced the
channel output.
Observe that this information-theoretic model differs from
the traditional t-user Multiple-Access Channel (MAC) be-
cause: (a) the decoder makes an error only when its output
does not match any of the transmitted messages, and (b) all
channel inputs are required to use the same codebook.
For a given t-user strategy V, the maximum probability of
error is given by
emax(F,Φ, V ) = max
u1,...,ut∈M
e({u1, . . . , ut}, F,Φ, V ). (7)
Note that here the users u1, . . . , ut are not necessarily distinct.
It is straightforward to see that the t-fingerprinting condition
(6) can now be expressed as
emax(F,Φ, V ) ≤ ε for every V ∈ Vt. (8)
Definition 2.4: For 0 < ε < 1, a number R ≥ 0 is an ε-
achievable rate for q-ary t-fingerprinting if for every δ > 0
and every n sufficiently large, there exists a randomized q-ary
code (F,Φ) of length n with rate
1
n
logqM > R− δ
and maximum probability of error satisfying (8).
The ε-capacity of q-ary t-fingerprinting Ct,q(ε) is the supre-
mum of all such ε-achievable rates. The capacity of q-ary t-
fingerprinting is the infimum of the ε-capacities for ε > 0,
i.e.,
Ct,q = lim
ε→0
Ct,q(ε).
To proceed with the capacity Ct,q, we wish to consider
coalitions of size exactly t. First, given any t-user strategy
V, define the maximum probability of error corresponding to
coalitions of size t alone as
e˜max(F,Φ, V ) = max
U :|U|=t
e(U, F,Φ, V ). (9)
The capacity value C˜t,q corresponding to the above criterion
can be similarly defined.
Proposition 2.5:
Ct,q = C˜t,q.
Clearly, Ct,q ≤ C˜t,q. The proof of the opposite inequality
is also almost obvious because any coalition of t pirates can
simply ignore any subset of t − τ pirates when devising a
forged fingerpint y. A formal version of this argument is
provided by Lemma A.1 in the Appendix.
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Similarly to the above, let us consider the average error
probability
eavg(F,Φ, V ) =
1
M t
∑
u1,...,ut∈M
e({u1, . . . , ut}, F,Φ, V ).
(10)
(this quantity will be used in the derivation of upper bounds
on the capacity Ct,q) and the probability
e˜avg(F,Φ, V ) =
1(
M
t
) ∑
U :|U|=t
e(U, F,Φ, V ). (11)
for coalitions of size exactly t. Define the capacity C˜at,q with
respect to the latter error probability.
We make a remark on the relation between the average and
maximum error criteria. In general, it is true that the average
error criterion yields a higher capacity value compared to the
maximum one. However, when randomization is allowed, it is
well-known for single-user channels that the capacity value is
the same for both the maximum and average error probability
criteria (cf. e.g., [11, p.223, Prob. 5]). We now extend this
argument to the current context of multi-user channels and
fingerprinting to show that both (9) and (11) lead to the same
capacity value.
Proposition 2.6:
C˜t,q = C˜
a
t,q.
A formal proof is available in the Appendix. It follows
because here we simply use a randomized code (F,Φ), which
also includes all M ! permutations of any specific realization of
(F,Φ). Because of the symmetry introduced by this, the error
probability e(U, F,Φ, V ) is the same for all coalitions for a
given V , and hence the average and the maximum probability
are the same.
III. LOWER BOUNDS FOR BINARY t-SECURE CODES,
t = 2, 3
In this section, we construct fingerprinting codes for t =
2, 3, with error probability decaying exponentially in n and
with higher rate than previous constructions. The improvement
is obtained by tailoring the decoder for the typical coalitions,
i.e., the coalitions that occur with high probability. We will say
that an event occurs with high probability if the probability that
it fails is at most exp(−cn), where c is a positive constant.
Our aim is to construct a sequence of randomized codes
(Fn,Φn), n = 1, 2, . . . , with error probability
max
V ∈Vt,n
emax(Fn,Φn, V )
decaying to zero. By Proposition 2.5, it suffices to consider
only coalitions of size exactly t. Suppose, for every n, there
exists a set Tt,n ⊆ (Qn)t such that for any coalition U of size
t, the observed fingerprints fK,n(U) belong to Tt,n with high
probability. We will refer to a set with this property as a typical
set. Thus, in constructing the required code it suffices to study
the conditions that allow us to obtain vanishing probability
Pr
{
φK,n(y) /∈ U
∣∣fK,n(U) = (x1, . . . ,xt)}
for any coalition U of size t, any typical t-tuple (x1, . . . ,xt)
of observed fingerprints, and any forgery y ∈ E(x1, . . . ,xt) as
n→∞. Our first result is a lower bound on the fingerprinting
capacity with 2 pirates over the binary alphabet.
Theorem 3.1:
C2,2 ≥ 1/4.
Proof: Fix Q = {0, 1}. Suppose that the encoding
mapping F assigns M = 2nR fingerprints to the users choos-
ing them uniformly and independently from all 2n different
vectors. For R < 1/2, the fingerprints will be distinct with
high probability.
Given a small ε > 0, we define the typical set as the set of
vector pairs which agree in l positions, where
l ∈ Iε = [n (1/2− ε) , n (1/2+ ε)] .
Consider any two pirates u1 and u2. Notice that their observed
fingerprints form a typical pair (x1,x2) with high probability
for an arbitrarily small ε. Hence, (x1,x2) agree in l ∈ Iε
positions. To create a forged fingerprint y the pirates must
fill the remaining n − l positions. Let d1 = dist(y,x1) and
d2 = dist(y,x2). Then n− l ∈ Iε and therefore
d1 + d2 ∈ Iε. (12)
Given a forgery y, the decoder only considers typical pairs
(x1,x2) from the codebook. Namely, the decoder takes any
pair of distances (d1, d2) that satisfy (12) and constructs the
full lists Sy(d1) and Sy(d2) of the fingerprints located at
distances d1 and d2 from y. Each pair (x1,x2) ∈ Sy(d1) ×
Sy(d2) is then discarded if they simultaneously disagree with
y in any position s, i.e., x1s = x2s 6= ys. All remaining
pairs contain y in their envelope. For each such pair (x1,x2),
the decoding is completed by choosing the pirate ui whose
fingerprint xi has a smaller distance di = dist(y,xi). Either
user is chosen if d1 = d2.
Obviously, the fingerprints x1 and x2 that belong to the
factual pirates will not be discarded by the above decoding
algorithm. The following probabilistic analysis shows that
for two innocent users, the decoder discards their observed
fingerprints (z1, z2) with high probability if the code rate
R < 1/4.
Indeed, for (z1, z2) to be typical, they should agree in l ∈ Iε
positions. In all these positions, z1, z2 should also agree with
y to fulfill the marking assumption. In each of the remaining
n− l positions, the vectors z1, z2 are represented by only two
combinations, (01) or (10). The probability of choosing such
a pair (z1, z2) in our random code equals
Pl =
(
n
l
)
2n−l/22n
and has exponential order of 2−n/2 for any l ∈ Iε. Further-
more, by the union bound, the total probability of choosing
such a pair in a random code of size M = 2nR is at most(
M
2
)∑
l∈Iε
(
n
l
)
2n−l/22n.
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This probability tends to 0 exponentially fast for any rate R <
0.25.
Similarly, consider a coalition (x1, z2) that includes the
fingerprint x1 of an actual pirate and the fingerprint z2 of an
innocent user. Recall that x1 disagrees with y in d1 positions.
Then to be output instead of x1, the fingerprint z2 must agree
with y in these positions and disagree with it in another set
of d2 ≤ d1 positions. The total probability of choosing such
a fingerprint z2 is at most
M2n−d1/2n.
Since d1 + d2 ∈ Iε and d2 ≤ d1, we have restriction
d2 ≤ n/2 (1/2+ ε) . In this case, the above probability tends
to 0 exponentially fast for any rate R < 0.25. Thus, at least
one pirate will be chosen from each coalition, and with high
probability, no remaining (innocent) users will be chosen as
pirates.
We note that considering typical coalitions enables us to
improve the lower bound C2,2 ≥ 0.2075 obtained in [9].
Next we establish a lower bound on the fingerprinting
capacity with 3 pirates over the binary alphabet.
Theorem 3.2:
C3,2 ≥ 1/12.
Proof: Suppose again that the encoding mapping F
assigns M = 2nR fingerprints to the users choosing them
uniformly and independently from all 2n different vectors. For
a triple (x1,x2,x3), let
L = {s ∈ [n] : x1s = x2s = x3s},
Lij = {s ∈ [n] : xis = xjs}, i, j = 1, 2, 3, i 6= j,
and let l = |L|, lij = |Lij |. Given a small ε > 0, we say that
(x1,x2,x3) form a typical triple if
l ∈ Jε = [n(1/4− ε), n(1/4+ ε)], (13)
l12, l13, l23 ∈ Iε = [n(1/2− ε), n(1/2+ ε)]. (14)
For any three users u1, u2, u3, note that the observed finger-
prints form a typical triple with high probability.
Using the same idea as before, we now take the observed
fingerprints (x1,x2,x3) to be a typical triple. A forged
fingerprint y agrees with all the three fingerprints on L and
takes arbitrarily values {0, 1} on the remaining subset [n]\L
positions. Let di = dist(y,xi) for i = 1, 2, 3. Note that every
position in [n]\L contributes 1 or 2 to the sum d1 + d2 + d3
implying
n(3/4− ε) ≤ d1 + d2 + d3 ≤ n(3/2+ 2ε). (15)
Given a forged fingerprint y, the decoder considers only
typical triples (x1,x2,x3) from the codebook. Each triple is
then discarded if the fingerprints in it simultaneously disagree
with y in any position s, i.e., x1s = x2s = x3s 6= ys. If a
triple (x1,x2,x3) is left, decoding is completed by choosing
the pirate whose fingerprint has the smallest distance to y
among x1,x2,x3.
Obviously, the fingerprints (x1,x2,x3) corresponding to
the factual pirates will not be discarded by the decoder. The
following probabilistic analysis shows that a randomly chosen
code of rate
R < 1/12 (16)
enables the decoder to discard with high probability all typical
triples (z1, z2, z3) of fingerprints formed by three innocent
users. Indeed, a typical triple can be identified only if the
fingerprints in it simultaneously agree with y in some subset of
l ∈ Jε positions. To simplify our analysis in this case, we can
even ignore the extra conditions (14) in any of the remaining
n− l positions. Thus, we allow the vectors (z1, z2, z3) to take
on any combination of binary symbols {0, 1} different from
all zeros or all ones. Given 6 such combinations, any typical
triple is chosen with probability at most
Pl ≤
(
n
l
)
6n−l/23n.
We further observe that the total probability of choosing such
a triple in a random code of size M = 2nR equals(
M
3
)∑
l∈Jε
(
n
l
)
6n−l/23n
and tends to 0 exponentially fast for any rate R < 1/12.
Now consider a slightly more involved case when the decoder
locates the pirate coalition (x1,x2,x3) along with another
coalition (x1, z2, z3) that includes the fingerprint x1 of an
actual pirate and the fingerprints z2, z3 of two innocent users.
In what follows, we prove that a random code of rate (16)
satisfies at least one of the following two conditions:
(i) The decoder chooses x1 in the coalition (x1, z2, z3) with
high probability.
(ii) The coalition (x1, z2, z3) has vanishing probability.
Recall that d1 = dist(y,x1). Then an innocent user, z2
say, can be output by the decoder if dist(y, z2) ≤ d1. The
probability that any such z2 is chosen among M random
codewords is obviously at most
2−nM
d1∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
.
Given a code of rate (16), this probability vanishes if d1/n ≤
0.33. Therefore, condition (i) above fails if
d1/n > 0.33. (17)
Now let us consider condition (ii) given this restriction.
Consider a typical coalition (x1, z2, z3). We have
l = |{s ∈ [n] : x1s = z2s = z3s = ys}|,
l′ = |{s ∈ [n] : z2s = z3s 6= x1s}|
Thus, the vectors z2, z3 have fixed values on the one subset
of size l, where these vectors are equal to x1, and on the other
non-overlapping subset of size l′, where the vectors z2, z3 are
equal to the binary complement of x1. According to conditions
(13) and (14), l ∈ Jε and
l′ = l23 − l ∈ J2ε.
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In the remaining n− l − l′ positions we have
(z2s, z3s) ∈ {(10), (01)}.
Summarizing the above arguments, we conclude that the total
probability of choosing such vectors z2, z3 in the random code
is bounded above as
2−2n
(
M
2
)∑
l∈Jε
∑
l′∈J2ε
(
n− d1
l
)(
n− l
l′
)
2n−l−l
′
.
Straightforward verification shows that this quantity vanishes
given conditions (13), (14), and (17) for a code of rate R <
0.086. Thus a random code of smaller rate (16) discards all
mixed coalitions of the form (x1, z2, z3) with high probabil-
ity.
The last remaining case, of a mixed coalition (x1,x2, z3),
is analyzed in a similar fashion (the analysis is simpler than
the one above and will be omitted).
IV. A WEAK CONVERSE UPPER BOUND
In finding upper bounds on fingerprinting capacity (here and
also in Section V), we restrict our attention to memoryless
coalition strategies in order to make the problem tractable
and to obtain single-letter expressions. Any upper bound on
the capacity thus obtained will be also valid in the original
problem.
Let Wt denote the family of discrete memoryless channels
(DMCs) W : Q× · · · × Q → Q with t inputs that satisfy the
marking assumption for a single letter, i.e.,
Wt = {W : W (y|x, . . . , x) = 0 if y 6= x, ∀x, y ∈ Q}. (18)
Note that the above definition corresponds to the wide-sense
envelope EW (·) defined in (4). For the narrow-sense envelope
EN (·) (3) and other variations of the problem it is possible to
define similar communication channels and study their upper
bounds on capacity.
Observe that Wt is a convex and compact set. Let s ∈ St,
called the “state”, be an index which identifies the particular
W ∈ Wt. Hence, we will often write W (y|x1, . . . , xt; s) for
channels in Wt.
We model a coalition’s strategy by a (discrete memoryless)
arbitrarily varying channel (AVC), i.e., the state of the channel
can vary from symbol to symbol. For a given state sequence
s ∈ Snt , the channel is given by
Wn(y|x1, . . . ,xt; s) =
n∏
l=1
W (yl|x1l, . . . , xtl; sl). (19)
We denote the family of such channels Wn(·|·, . . . , ·; s) :
Qn × · · · × Qn → Qn, s ∈ Snt by Wnt .
Since the state sequence s completely identifies the channel,
we will use eavg(F,Φ, s) to denote the error probability in (10).
A. The general case
Theorem 4.1: Let (F,Φ) be a q-ary t-fingerprinting code
with ε-error (0 < ε < 1) of length n, rate R, and |K| keys,
such that εqnR ≥ 2t. Then
R ≤
1
1− 2tε
(
max
PKX1...Xt
min
W∈Wt
I(X1, . . . , Xt;Y |K) + ξn
)
where ξn = t logq 2/n, X1, . . . , Xt, Y are q-ary r.v.’s,
PY |X1...Xt = W, K is a r.v. taking values over a set
of cardinality |K| and satisfying the Markov chain K ↔
X1, . . . , Xt ↔ Y, and the maximization is over joint distribu-
tions
PKX1...Xt = PK × PX1|K × · · · × PXt|K
with PX1|K = · · · = PXt|K .
(20)
Proof:
Let K be a set of keys and let {(fk, φk), k ∈ K} be a
family of codes with probability distribution pi(k) over K.
Since (F,Φ) is t-fingerprinting with ε-error, it satisfies
eavg(F,Φ, s) ≤ ε for every s ∈ Snt . (21)
Let U1, . . . , Ut be independent r.v.’s uniformly distributed over
the message set {1, . . . , qnR} and let K be a r.v. independent
of U1, . . . , Ut, and with probability distribution pi(k) over K.
Also, let
Xi , fK(Ui), i = 1, . . . , t. (22)
Fix some s ∈ Snt and let Y be such that PY |X1,...,Xt =
Wn(·|·, . . . , ·; s). Then, we have
Pr(φK(Y ) /∈ {U1, . . . , Ut}) ≤ ε, (23)
which follows from (21). We also have the following Markov
chain
U1, . . . , Ut,K ↔X1, . . . ,Xt
Wn
←→ Y . (24)
Now,
I(U1, . . . , Ut;Y |K) = tnR−H(U1, . . . , Ut|Y ,K), (25)
because U1, . . . , Ut are independent and uniformly distributed
over M. The second term in (25) can be bounded above as
follows. Define Ei = 1(φK(Y ) 6= Ui), i = 1, . . . , t. Let
pi = Pr(Ei = 0, Ej = 1, j = 1, . . . , t, j 6= i), i = 1, . . . , t.
Since φK(Y ), E1, . . . , Et are known given K,Y , U1, . . . , Ut,
H(U1, . . . , Ut|Y ,K)
= H(U1, . . . , Ut, E1, . . . , Et|Y , φK(Y ),K)
≤ t logq 2 +H(U1, . . . , Ut|Y , φK(Y ),K,E1, . . . , Et)
(26)
≤ t logq 2 + εtnR+ 2
tq−nRtnR
+
t∑
i=1
piH(U
t
1\Ui|Ui,Y ,K,Ei = 0, Ej = 1, j 6= i) (27)
≤ t logq 2 + (ε+ 2
tq−nR)tnR+ (t− 1)nR.
Equation (26) holds true because E1, . . . , Et are binary r.v.’s
and the term 2tq−nRtnR in (27) follows from the fact that
there are at most 2t remaining terms and each can be bounded
above by q−nRtnR. Using this in (25), we obtain
nR(1−(ε+2tq−nR)t) ≤ I(U1, . . . , Ut;Y |K)+t logq 2. (28)
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We now use the premise that εqnR ≥ 2t, together with (24)
and the memoryless property of the channel, which results in
R ≤
1
1− 2tε
(
1
n
I(U1, . . . , Ut;Y |K) + ξn
)
≤
1
1− 2tε
(
1
n
I(X1, . . . ,Xt;Y |K) + ξn
)
≤
1
1− 2tε
(
1
n
n∑
l=1
I(X1l, . . . , Xtl;Yl|K) + ξn
)
.
Moreover, since the above bound applies for every s ∈ Snt ,
i.e., for every Wn ∈ Wnt ,
R ≤
1
1− 2tε
(
1
n
min
Wn∈Wnt
n∑
l=1
I(X1l, . . . , Xtl;Yl|K) + ξn
)
=
1
1− 2tε
(
1
n
n∑
l=1
min
W∈Wt
I(X1l, . . . , Xtl;Yl|K) + ξn
)
,
because the minimization is over channels whose state may
vary over Wt for every letter. Note that X1, . . . ,Xt are
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) given K (by
(22)). Therefore, given K, for every l ∈ [n], X1l, . . . , Xtl are
i.i.d. Hence,
R ≤
1
1− 2tε
(
max
PKX1...Xt
min
W∈Wt
I(X1, . . . , Xt;Y |K) + ξn
)
.
where the maximization is over joint distributions satisfying
(20).
Corollary 4.2:
Ct,q ≤ min
W∈Wt
max
PX1...Xt
I(X1, . . . , Xt;Y ), (29)
where X1, . . . , Xt, Y are q-ary r.v.’s, PY |X1...Xt = W and the
maximization is over joint distributions such that X1, . . . , Xt
are i.i.d.
Proof: As we prove only a min-max type result, it be-
comes sufficient to consider only “fixed” memoryless coalition
strategies, i.e., strategies that remain fixed at every symbol
instead of varying arbitrarily. In the subsequent text, Wn will
denote the n-letter extension of a DMC W.
Consider any sequence of t-fingerprinting codes
(Fn,Φn), n = 1, 2, . . . of rate R and error εn, where
εn approaches 0 as n increases. Then
eavg(F,Φ,W
n) ≤ εn for every W ∈ Wt. (30)
Fix some W ∈ Wt. We find that (28) holds for every n.
Therefore by the arguments in Theorem 4.1
R ≤
1
1− ε′n
(
1
n
n∑
l=1
I(X1l, . . . , Xtl;Yl|K) + ξn
)
, (31)
where both ε′n = (εn + 2tq−nR)t and ξn approach 0 as n→
∞. Considering the inner term, we note that
1
n
n∑
l=1
I(X1l, . . . , Xtl;Yl|K) ≤ I(X1l∗ , . . . , Xtl∗ ;Yl∗ |K = k
∗),
where l∗ = l∗(W ) and k∗ = k∗(W ) are the coordinate and
key which maximize the mutual information. The term on the
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Fig. 1. The uniform channel with 2 pirates
r.h.s. is a function of (PX1l∗ ...Xtl∗ |K=k∗ ,W ). For every l ∈
[n], X1l, . . . , Xtl are i.i.d. when conditioned on K. Therefore
this term is at most
max
PX1...Xt
I(X1, . . . , Xt;Y ),
where X1, . . . , Xt, Y are q-ary r.v.’s with PY |X1,...,Xt = W,
and the maximization is over i.i.d. r.v.’s. Finally, since (31) is
true for every W ∈ Wt, we obtain the stated result by taking
n→∞.
B. The binary case
Consider the case where Q = {0, 1}. We would like to
evaluate the upper bound on Ct,2 given by Corollary 4.2.
Computing the exact optimum in this formula is a difficult
problem. Instead of attempting this, we will use a particular
channel W in (29) and compute a maximum on the prior
distribution PX1...Xt for this channel. The resulting value of
the rate gives an upper bound on capacity Ct,2. Let W be the
“uniform channel” defined by
W (1|x1, . . . , xt) =
w
t
, W (0|x1, . . . , xt) = 1−
w
t
,
where w is the number of 1s among x1, . . . , xt. Fig. 1
shows the uniform channel for t = 2. Intuitively this choice
is the worst strategy of the coalition from the distributor’s
perspective.
If X1, . . . , Xt are independent binary-valued r.v.’s with
P (Xi = 1) = p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , t, and Y is the
output of the uniform channel with inputs X1, . . . , Xt, we
have P (Y = 1) = p and
H(Y |X1, . . . , Xt) =
t∑
i=0
(
t
i
)
pi(1− p)t−ih
(
i
t
)
.
Evaluating the maximum mutual information in (29) for this
channel gives a closed-form upper bound:
Theorem 4.3:
Ct,2 ≤ max
p∈[0,1]
{
h(p)−
t∑
i=0
(
t
i
)
pi(1− p)t−ih
(
i
t
)}
(32)
≤
1
t ln 2
. (33)
A proof of the estimate (33) is given in the Appendix.
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V. A STRONG CONVERSE UPPER BOUND
A. The general case
Theorem 5.1: For any 0 < ε < 1,
Ct,q(ε) ≤ min
W∈Wt
max
PX1...Xt
max
i=1,...,t
I(Xi;Y |X
i−1
1 , X
t
i+1), (34)
where X1, . . . , Xt, Y are q-ary r.v.’s, PY |X1...Xt = W and the
maximization is over joint distributions such that X1, . . . , Xt
are independent.
Proof: We borrow techniques from [1] in this proof. The
result is proved for the case t = 2 to ease understanding. It
is a straightforward extension for arbitrary t. In the proof, all
logarithms are to the base q.
Consider a family of n-length codes {(fk, φk), k ∈ K} for
M users with probability distribution pi(k) over K which is
2-fingerprinting with ε-error (0 < ε < 1). Therefore
eavg(F,Φ,W
n) ≤ ε for every W ∈ W2.
Let x(k)i = fk(i) denote the fingerprints and D
(k)
i = {y :
φk(y) = i} denote the decoding regions for i = 1, . . . ,M, k ∈
K. Then the above error criterion can be written as follows:
For every W ∈ W2,
∑
k∈K
pi(k)
1
M2
M∑
i,j=1
Wn(D
(k)
i ∪D
(k)
j |x
(k)
i ,x
(k)
j ) ≥ 1− ε.
Fix some W ∈ W2. There exists a k∗ = k∗(W ) ∈ K such
that
1
M2
M∑
i,j=1
Wn(D
(k∗)
i ∪D
(k∗)
j |x
(k∗)
i ,x
(k∗)
j ) ≥ 1− ε.
Hereafter, we drop the superscript k∗ for simplicity. Conse-
quently, either
1
M2
M∑
i,j=1
Wn(Di|xi,xj) ≥
1− ε
2
(35)
or
1
M2
M∑
i,j=1
Wn(Dj |xi,xj) ≥
1− ε
2
(36)
must be true. Let us assume (35) is true. We first find a subset
A of “good” pairs of users (messages) for W. Define
A , {(i, j) : Wn(Di|xi,xj) ≥ 1− ε¯, 1 ≤ i, j ≤M}, (37)
where ε¯ is such that 0 < 1− ε¯ < (1− ε)/2. Then
|A| ≥ (1− ε∗)M2, where ε∗ , 1 + ε
2ε¯
. (38)
Next, we derive a subset A¯ of the “good” pairs where ap-
proximate independence holds between the fingerprints (code-
words) corresponding to a pair of users (messages) uniformly
distributed over this subset. This is needed to restrict the
maximization in the final result (34) to joint distributions
where the r.v.’s are independent.
Lemma 5.2: [1] Let C = {x1, . . . ,xM} ⊆ Qn, A ⊂
{1, . . . ,M} × {1, . . . ,M} with |A| ≥ (1 − ε∗)M2, 0 <
ε∗ < 1. Then for any 0 < γ < ε∗/(1 − ε∗), 0 ≤
λ < 1, there exist l1, . . . , lr ∈ [n], where r ≤ ε∗/(γ(1 −
ε∗)), and some (x¯1, x¯′1), . . . , (x¯r, x¯′r), such that for A¯ ,
{(i, j) ∈ A : xilm = x¯m, xjlm = x¯
′
m, ∀m ∈ [r]}
(a)
∣∣A¯∣∣ ≥ λr |A|, and
(b) For all x1, x2 ∈ Q, l ∈ [n],
(1 + γ) Pr(X¯1l = x1) Pr(X¯2l = x2)− γ − |Q|
2λ
≤ Pr(X¯1l = x1, X¯2l = x2)
≤ max
{
(1 + γ) Pr(X¯1l = x1) Pr(X¯2l = x2), λ
}
,
where (X¯1, X¯2) is a pair of r.v.’s with uniform distribu-
tion on {(xi,xj) : (i, j) ∈ A¯}.
Applying Lemma 5.2 to A as in (37) with parameters γ =
n−1/2, λ = n−1, we obtain
∣∣A¯∣∣ ≥ λr |A| , for some r ≤ n1/2ε∗/(1− ε∗). (39)
For j = 1, . . . ,M, define B(j) = {i : (i, j) ∈ A¯, 1 ≤
i ≤ M}. Observe that the subcode corresponding to B(j) is
a “good” code for the single-user channel obtained by fixing
the second input to j. Thus, the single-user strong converse
given below holds for this subcode.
Lemma 5.3: [5] If (f, φ) is a code with codewords
{x1, . . . ,xM} ⊆ Q
n and decoding regions Di, i = 1, . . . ,M,
for the (non-stationary) single-user DMC {Wl}∞l=1, such that
for every i = 1, . . . ,M, Pr(Di|xi) ≥ 1− ε¯, 0 < ε¯ < 1, then
logM ≤
n∑
l=1
I(Xl;Yl) +O(n
1/2),
where X is distributed uniformly on the set of codewords.
Using Lemma 5.3 on the subcode B(j),
log |B(j)| ≤
n∑
l=1
I(X¯1l; Y¯l|X¯2l = xjl) +O(n
1/2), (40)
where (X¯1, X¯2) are distributed as in Lemma 5.2 and
PY¯ |X¯1,X¯2 = W
n. Furthermore, using (40), we obtain
|A¯|−1
∑
(i,j)∈A¯
log |B(j)|
≤ |A¯|−1
∑
(i,j)∈A¯
n∑
l=1
I(X¯1l; Y¯l|X¯2l = xjl)
∑
x∈Q
1(xjl = x)
+O(n1/2)
=
n∑
l=1
∑
x∈Q
|A¯|−1
∑
(i,j)∈A¯
1(xjl = x)I(X¯1l; Y¯l|X¯2l = xjl)
+O(n1/2)
=
n∑
l=1
I(X¯1l; Y¯l|X¯2l) +O(n
1/2), (41)
since Pr(X¯2l = x) = |A¯|−1
∑
(i,j)∈A¯ 1(xjl = x) for l ∈ [n].
We next establish a lower bound on the left-side term in order
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to obtain an inequality for M.
|A¯|−1
∑
(i,j)∈A¯
log |B(j)| = |A¯|−1
M∑
j=1
|B(j)| log |B(j)| (42)
≥ |A¯|−1
∑
j:|B(j)|≥ 1−ε
∗
n
Mλr
|B(j)| log |B(j)|
≥ |A¯|−1 log
(
1− ε∗
n
Mλr
) ∑
j:|B(j)|≥ 1−ε
∗
n
Mλr
|B(j)| (43)
where (42) follows from the definition of B(j). Now,∑
j:|B(j)|≥ 1−ε
∗
n
Mλr
|B(j)|
=
M∑
j=1
|B(j)| −
∑
j:|B(j)|< 1−ε
∗
n
Mλr
|B(j)|
≥ |A¯| −
1− ε∗
n
M2λr
≥ |A¯| −
1
n
|A¯|
by using (38) and (39). Using this inequality in (43), we get
|A¯|−1
∑
(i,j)∈A¯
log |B(j)| ≥
(
1−
1
n
)
log
(
1− ε∗
n
Mλr
)
.
(44)
Combining (41), (44) and (39),
logM ≤
(
1 +
1
n− 1
)( n∑
l=1
I(X¯1l; Y¯l|X¯2l) +O(n
1/2)
)
− log(1 − ε∗) + logn+
ε∗
1− ε∗
n1/2 logn
≤
n∑
l=1
I(X¯1l; Y¯l|X¯2l) +O(n
1/2 log n). (45)
Although the above inequality resembles what is needed
in the theorem, note that X¯1l and X¯2l are not necessarily
independent. For l ∈ [n], let (X1l, X2l, Yl) be r.v.’s with
distribution
Pr(X1l = x1, X2l = x2, Yl = y) =
Pr(X¯1l = x1) Pr(X¯2l = x2)W (y|x1, x2)
for all x1, x2, y ∈ Q. From Lemma 5.2(b), for n−1/2 ≥
|Q|2n−1 and every l ∈ [n]
(1 + n−1/2) Pr(X¯1l = x1) Pr(X¯2l = x2)− 2n
−1/2
≤ Pr(X¯1l = x1, X¯2l = x2)
≤ (1 + n−1/2) Pr(X¯1l = x1) Pr(X¯2l = x2) + n
−1,
i.e., |Pr(X1l = x1, X2l = x2)
− Pr(X¯1l = x1, X¯2l = x2)| ≤ 2n
−1/2.
Thus, by the uniform continuity of mutual information, for all
l ∈ [n],
|I(X1l;Yl|X2l)− I(X¯1l; Y¯l|X¯2l)| ≤ αn,
where αn → 0 as n → ∞. Together with (45) and dividing
by n,
R ≤ max
PX1X2=PX1PX2
I(X1;Y |X2) + βn, (46)
where βn = αn +O(n−1/2 logn)→ 0 as n→∞. Similarly,
assuming (36) is true, one can prove
R ≤ max
PX1X2=PX1PX2
I(X2;Y |X1) + β
′
n. (47)
Since either (46) or (47) holds for every W ∈ W2, taking
n→∞ concludes the proof.
B. The binary case
Fix Q = {0, 1}. For the case of t = 2 and t = 3, we
again pick the uniform channel and obtain upper bounds on
the expression in Theorem 5.1, which turn out to be stronger
than the bounds resulting from (32). The calculations become
quite tedious for larger t. For t = 2, let X1, X2 be independent
binary-valued r.v.’s with P (Xi = 1) = pi, 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, i =
1, 2, and let Y be the output of the uniform channel with
inputs X1 and X2. We have
H(Y |X2) = (1 − p2)h
(p1
2
)
+ p2h
(
1− p1
2
)
H(Y |X1, X2) = (1 − p1)p2 + p1(1 − p2).
Computing the maximum conditional mutual information
gives C2,2 ≤ 0.322. A similar computation for t = 3 yields
H(Y |X2, X3)
= (1 − p2)(1− p3)h
(p1
3
)
+ (1− p2)p3h
(
1 + p1
3
)
+ p2(1− p3)h
(
1 + p1
3
)
+ p2p3h
(
1− p1
3
)
,
H(Y |X1, X2, X3)
= (1− p1p2p3 − (1− p1)(1 − p2)(1− p3))h
(
1
3
)
,
and the maximization gives C3,2 ≤ 0.199. Combining these
upper bounds with our lower bounds from Theorem 3.1 and
Theorem 3.2 we obtain:
Theorem 5.4:
0.25 ≤ C2,2 ≤ 0.322.
0.083 ≤ C3,2 ≤ 0.199.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we prove new lower bounds on the maximum
rate of binary fingerprinting codes for 2 and 3 pirates by
considering typical coalitions which improves the random
coding results obtained previously in the literature. We also
prove several new upper bounds on fingerprinting capacity
relying upon converse theorems for a class of channels which
are similar to the multiple-access channel. Our results establish
for the binary case, Ct,2 ≤ (t ln 2)−1. Combined with the
result of [17] this implies that O(1/t2) ≤ Ct,2 ≤ O(1/t). For
the general case with arbitrary alphabets, we have established
some upper bounds on the capacity involving single-letter
mutual information quantities.
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APPENDIX
A. A lemma on the size of coalitions
Lemma A.1: Let (F,Φ) be a randomized code of size at
least 2t− 1. Assume that
e˜max(F,Φ, V ) ≤ ε for every V ∈ Vt. (48)
Then for any τ ≤ t,
e˜max(F,Φ, V ) ≤ 2ε for every V ∈ Vτ .
Proof: For simplicity of presentation we take τ = t− 1.
The general case of 1 ≤ τ < t can be established with only
minor changes to the proof below. For any V ∈ Vt−1, let us
define a V ′ ∈ Vt where
V ′(y|x1, . . . ,xt−1,xt) = V (y|x1, . . . ,xt−1),
∀x1, . . . ,xt,y ∈ Q
n.
Then, for any coalition U of size t− 1, and any user u /∈ U,
e(U, F,Φ, V )
= EK
∑
y:
φK(y)/∈U
V (y|fK(U))
= EK
∑
y:
φK(y)/∈U
V ′(y|fK(U), fK(u))
= EK
[ ∑
y:
φK(y)/∈U
′
V ′(y|fK(U
′)) +
∑
y:
φK(y)=u
V ′(y|fK(U
′))
]
,
(49)
where U ′ = U∪{u}. The first term in the last equation satisfies
e(U ′, F,Φ, V ′) ≤ ε (50)
by the assumption of the lemma. We will next show that the
second term in (49) is also at most ε. Suppose for the sake of
contradiction that
EK
∑
y:
φK(y)=u
V ′(y|fK(U
′)) > ε.
Let u′ /∈ U ′ and U ′′ = U ∪ {u′} (we assume that the size of
the code is at least t+2, or at least 2t−1 in the general case).
Then
e(U ′′, F,Φ, V ′)
= EK
∑
y:
φK(y)/∈U
′′
V ′(y|fK(U
′′))
≥ EK
∑
y:φK(y)=u
V ′(y|fK(U
′)) > ε.
But this contradicts our initial assumption (48).
B. Proof of Proposition 2.6
It is clear that C˜t,q ≤ C˜at,q. Therefore, it is enough to
show that for every randomized code (F,Φ), there exists
another randomized code (F ∗,Φ∗) of the same rate such that
e˜max(F
∗,Φ∗, V ) = e˜avg(F,Φ, V ) for every channel V.
We are given {(fk, φk), k ∈ K}. Let σ ∈ Σ identify a
particular permutation from the set of all permutations on the
message set M. Choose σ uniformly at random from Σ and
construct a new key κ , (k, σ). Define
f∗κ(·) , fk(σ(·)),
φ∗κ(·) , σ
−1(φk(·)).
Let (F ∗,Φ∗) be the randomized code corresponding to the
family {(f∗κ , φ∗κ), κ ∈ K × Σ}. Then, for every channel V,
e˜avg(F
∗,Φ∗, V ) = e˜avg(F,Φ, V ). Furthermore, for any U ⊆
M, |U | = t,
e(U, F ∗,Φ∗, V )
=
1
M !
∑
σ∈Σ
∑
k∈K
pi(k)
∑
y:
φk(y)/∈σ(U)
V (y|fk(σ(U)))
which does not depend on the subset U because of the aver-
aging over all permutations. This implies e˜max(F ∗,Φ∗, V ) =
e˜avg(F
∗,Φ∗, V ).
C. Proof of Theorem 4.3
Our goal is to estimate maxp∈[0,1] u(p, t), where we use the
following notation
u(p, t) = h(p)−
t∑
i=0
αih
(
i
t
)
.
αi =
(
t
i
)
pi(1− p)t−i.
First, note that h is a concave function, and therefore u(p, t)
is non-negative for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Bernstein proved that
the sequence of polynomials Bt(p) =
∑t
i=0 αif(i/t), t =
1, 2, . . . , where f is a function continuous on [0, 1], provides
a uniform approximation to f on [0, 1]. His proof, found for
instance in Feller [13] §7.2, relies on the weak law of large
numbers. Refining the proof in the case of the function h, we
show that for any p ∈ [0, 1] and any t,
u(p, t) ≤
1
t ln 2
. (51)
It suffices to consider the case p ∈ (0, 1/2]. Given some
x = i/t, let us write a quadratic Taylor approximation for
h(x) :
h (x) = h(p) + (x− p) log2
1− p
p
+
(x− p)2
2
a(x) (52)
where the coefficient a(x) depends on x, since a(x) = h′′(γ)
for some γ ∈ [x, p]. We shall also consider the residual
function
g˜ (x) = h (x) − h(p)− (x− p) log2
1− p
p
.
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Fig. 2. To the proof that a(x0) > a(0).
The main part of our proof is to show that for any x ∈ [0, 1],
2p−2 log2 (1− p) ≤ a(x) ≤ 0. (53)
The right inequality is obvious since h′′ (x) < 0 for all 0 <
x < 1. The left inequality will be proven in two steps.
Let us take any point x0 ∈ [0, p]. Then we compare g˜ (x)
with the quadratic function
gx0(x) = a(x0)
(x − p)2
2
on the entire interval x ∈ [0, p]. We first prove that functions
gx0(x) and g˜ (x) coincide at only two points, namely p and
x0. Indeed, let us assume that there exists a third such point
x1. Without loss of generality, let x0 < x1 < p. The functions
gx0(x) and g˜ (x) coincide at the ends of both intervals [x0, x1]
and [x1, p]; therefore there exist two points θ′ ∈ (x0, x1) and
θ′′ ∈ (x1, p) where both functions have equal derivatives:
a(x0)(θ
′ − p) = log2
1− θ′
θ′
− log2
1− p
p
;
a(x0)(θ
′′ − p) = log2
1− θ′′
θ′′
− log2
1− p
p
.
The left sides of both equalities represent a linear function of
θ given by a(x0)(θ − p) whereas the right sides represent a
convex function log2 1−θθ − log2
1−p
p . A linear function can
intersect a convex function at no more than two points. This
leads to a contradiction, which shows that x0 = x1 and that
the functions gx0(x) and g˜ (x) intersect at two points p and
x0.
Our next step is to find the minimum a(x) ≤ 0 for all
x ∈ [0, p]. Compare the function gx0(x) with g0(x) for any
parameter x0 ∈ (0, p]. Now we use the fact that both functions
intersect g˜ (x) at only two points, one of which is x = p.
However, g0(x) has its second intersection x = 0 to the left
of x0. Thus, g0(x) < gx0(x) for 0 ≤ x < p and therefore,
a(x0) > a(0) (see Fig. 2). Now we conclude that
a(0) = min
x∈[0,p]
a(x).
Finally, we find a(0) using the equality g0(0) = g˜ (0) ,
which gives a(0) = 2p−2 log2(1 − p).
The second interval x ∈ [p, 1] can be considered similarly.
Again, we use the same arguments and conclude that the end
point x = 1 gives the minimum a(1) = minx∈[p,1] a(x). Direct
calculation also shows that the global minimum is achieved at
0 as a(0) < a(1) for all p < 1/2, and a(1) = a(0) for
p = 1/2. This gives us the left inequality in (53) and shows
that for any p ≤ 1/2 and any x ∈ [0, 1],
h (x) ≥ h(p) + (x− p) log2
1− p
p
+ (x− p)2
log2 (1− p)
p2
.
Let us take x = i/t, i = 0, 1, . . . , t and substitute the above
estimate into the expression for u(p, t). In this substitution,
we also use the first two moments of the binomial distribution
{αi} , which gives
S1 ,
t∑
i=0
αi
(
i
t − p
)
= 0
S2 ,
t∑
i=0
αi
(
i
t − p
)2
=
p(1− p)
t
.
Then
u(p, t) ≤ − log2
1− p
p
S1 −
log2(1− p)
p2
S2
≤ −
(1− p) ln(1− p)
pt ln 2
.
Finally, it is easy to verify that the function − (1−p) ln(1−p)p
monotonically decreases on the interval [0, 12 ] and achieves its
maximum 1 at p = 0. This establishes (51) and hence the
bound (33).
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